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)
)
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)
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v.

)
)

JOSE GUADALUPE PEREZ-JUNGO,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.
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APPELLANT'S BRI
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jose Guadalupe Perez-Jungo asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the
opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 43 (Ct. App. 2014) (hereinafter,
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the district court's order denying
Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress, is in conflict with previous decisions of this Court
and the United States Supreme Court, as well as with its own precedent, in that it held
that an officer does not need to articulate a reasonable suspicion of any particular
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criminal activity before engaging in a prolonged investigative detention; he need only
have an non-specific belief that some crime is

Further, the Court of Appeals

held that a fact that was part of the totality of the circumstances bearing on the
reasonable suspicion analysis, and actually considered and included by the district court
its decision, could not be discussed on appeal because of the mistaken belief that the
fact was not argued below and was, therefore, not preserved for appeal.
If review is granted, Mr. Perez-Jungo requests that this Court reverse the district
court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. Mr. Perez-Jungo asserts that the district
court erred in denying his Motion to
subsequent

ppress because his prolonged detention and the

of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Trooper Marquez of the Idaho State Police saw a truck parked to the side of a
two-lane road in the middle of the night. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1 0-15, p.11, Ls.13-24.) 1 The road
was gravel with no divider markers and had borrow pits on both sides of the gravel.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.19-25, p.12, Ls.1-9.) The truck was pulled to the edge of the gravel.
(Tr., p.11, Ls.6-24; Exhibit 12.) Trooper Marquez testified at the hearing on the Motion
to Suppress that he thought the vehicle might be abandoned or that someone might
need help. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.24.) He turned on his emergency lights and his
spotlight, which he trained on the driver's side mirror.

(Tr., p.15, Ls.2-7.)

Trooper

Marquez explained that he activated his emergency lights for officer safety because he
wanted to let people know he was a police officer.

1

(Tr., p.15, Ls.S-25.)

Trooper

All transcript citations refer to the transcript of the Motion to Suppress hearing held on
January 29, 2013, unless otherwise indicated.
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testified that

thought the truck might

"vandalisms or thefts" that had occurred in the area

involved in

r to

or that

truck may have been stolen. (Tr., p.14, Ls.1-5, p.40, Ls.14-25.)
Trooper Marquez approached the passenger-side window and saw Mr. PerezJungo sitting in the driver's
the window.

(Tr., p.20, Ls.1-3.)

(Tr., p.19, Ls.22-24.) Trooper Marquez knocked on
Mr. Perez-Jungo was attempting to roll down the

window when Trooper Marquez opened the passenger door.

(Tr., p.20, Ls.15-21.)

Trooper Marquez testified that he opened the passenger door because he "just wanted
know what was going on and why [Mr. Perez-Jungo] was out there to make sure he
need assistance." (Tr., p.20, Ls.1
Trooper

1.)

that, after he opened

Muerte 2 mounted on the dashboard.

door, he saw a figurine of

(Tr., p.20, L.22

p.21, L.1 0.)

He also

testified that Mr. Perez-Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. (Tr., p.22, Ls.?-10.)
Trooper Marquez asked Mr. Perez-Jungo what he was doing and Mr. Perez-Jungo
explained that he was waiting for someone who was going to talk to him about
employment. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-15.) Trooper Marquez asked if he had been drinking and
Mr. Perez-Jungo said he had not. (Tr., p.42, Ls.S-12.) Trooper Marquez then asked for
Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration, which he took back to his patrol car.

2

"Santa Muerte is a religious figure who receives petitions for love, luck, and protection.
This saint is frequently dressed as the Grim Reaper with a scythe and scales. Grim
Reaper statues are made in red, white, green and black - for love, luck, financial
success and protection. Offerings to Santa Muerte include roses and tequila. Public
shrines to Santa Muerte are adorned with red roses, cigars, and bottles of tequila.
Throughout Mexico, and in parts of the United States (especially in Mexican immigrant
communities), Santa Muerte prayer cards, medals, and candles are made and routinely
sold to the public." (Exhibit 11.)
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Ls.9-10.)
d

Trooper

ran the license plate for the truck through

and determined the truck was not

. (Tr., p.41, Ls.1

While he continued to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper Marquez asked dispatch
send a drug detection dog and requested a second patrol unit (Tr., p.24, Ls.13-21.)
When he was told by dispatch that a drug dog would take at least 20 minutes to arrive,
Trooper Marquez said that he "didn't have enough time" to wait for the dog. (Exhibit 12,
at 10:21 ).

However, while still holding Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration,

Trooper Marquez waited 10 or 15 minutes for another unit to arrive. (Tr., p.27, Ls.4-8.)
Three additional units arrived and Trooper Marquez ordered Mr. Perez-Jungo out of his
truck. (Tr., p.44, Ls.20-22, p.25, Ls.19-23.) Trooper Marquez spoke with his sergeant
and with the other officers and told them that the reason for the detention was that
"obviously something was not right." (Tr., p.47, Ls.15-19.)

At no point did Trooper

Marquez tell any of the other officers that he was investigating Mr. Perez-Jungo for
driving under the influence or for drug trafficking. (Tr., p.47, Ls.3-14.)
Trooper Marquez placed Mr. Perez-Jungo in front of his patrol car and
questioned him about prior drug use.

(Tr., p.27, Ls.13-25, p.28, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Perez-

Jungo was never asked to perform any sobriety tests or answer any questions that
would be used to evaluate a person for driving under the influence. (Tr., p.44, Ls.S-19.)
Meanwhile, other officers shined their flashlights into the windows of Mr. Perez-Jungo's
truck. (Tr., p.27, Ls.21-22, p.48, Ls.20-24.) Following this examination of the interior of
Mr. Perez-Jungo's truck, Deputy Kingsland told Trooper Marquez that he saw a baggie
with an orange substance in it on the dashboard and a light bulb that appeared to be
hollowed out in the netting behind the passenger seat, which he testified can be used as
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a smoking

to

Marquez then

(Tr.,
truck.

Ls.7-1

p.57,

(Preliminary Hearing

1

1

) Trooper

11/21/12, p.13,

Ls.17-24.) Trooper Marquez scraped the light bulb and tested the residue using a NIK
test, which returned a presumptive positive result for cocaine.
Transcript 11/21/1

(Preliminary Hearing

p.14, Ls.1-23.) Trooper Marquez then found a baggie in the pocket

of a jacket on the passenger seat containing a substance that he also tested, which
returned a presumptive positive result for cocaine and amphetamine.

(Preliminary

Hearing Transcript 11/21/12, p.16, Ls.18-25, p.17, Ls.1
Mr. Perez-Jungo was charged with one count of possession of cocaine, but the
information was

to

the substance

methamphetamine, and one

misdemeanor count of possession of drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.52-53, 155-156.)

Mr. Perez-Jungo filed a Motion to Suppress arguing that the detention, search, and
interrogation violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. (R., pp.67-80.)
In his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Perez-Jungo argued, among other things, that
reasonable suspicion did not exist that would support Trooper Marquez's investigative
detention.

(R., p.76.) At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Trooper Marquez

testified that the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine was a basis for his suspicions.
(Tr., p.22, Ls.16-21.) Defense counsel specifically cross-examined Deputy Kingsland
about the religious significance of Santa Muerte.

(Tr., p.59, L.20 - p.60, L.6.)

A

photograph of the Santa Muerte figurine was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit
5. (R., p.120.)
The district court denied, in part, Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress.
(R., pp.116-139.)

The district court found that Trooper Marquez had "objective and
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engage in impaired driving or drug trafficking."

, p.135.) The district court further

stated that, "Marquez observed bloodshot and glassy eyes which indicate potential drug
or alcohol impairment" and that, "Marquez also observed the Santa Muerte statue which
is, as Marquez has learned through drug interdiction training, a common patron saint to
drug traffickers." (R., p.134.) Finally, the district court cited two federal court cases
where the image of Santa Muerte has been "linked to drug trafficking or criminal
activity."

(R., p.135.)

The district court concluded that Trooper Marquez had

reasonable suspicion to suspect that Mr. Perez-Jungo was "driving while impaired
and/or had drugs in the vehicle" because:
1. Mr. Perez-Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and glassy
Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked in a remote area late at night and explained
he was waiting to speak with someone about a job
3. The presence of the Santa Muerte figurine on the dashboard
(R., p.135.)
Mr. Perez-Jungo entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of
methamphetamine, preserving the ability to challenge the district court's order denying
his Motion to Suppress.

(R., pp.172-178.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a

unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and
placed Mr. Perez-Jungo on probation.

(R., pp.170-171.)

Mr. Perez-Jungo appealed

from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.193-194.)
On appeal, Mr. Perez-Jungo argued that Trooper Marquez did not have
reasonable suspicion to continue to detain him because the factors cited by the district
court- bloodshot and glassy eyes, time of night and remote location, and the Santa
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Muerte figurine

did not amount to

suspicion of driving u

or drug trafficking. (See generally Appellant's

the influence

)

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision denying Mr.
Jungo's Motion to Suppress.

(Opinion, p.1 0.)

The Court of Appeals held that the

reasonable suspicion standard does not require suspicion of a specific crime and,
therefore, Mr. Perez-Jungo could not argue that the facts of the case were not sufficient
to provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving or illegal drug activity separately.
(Opinion, pp.6-7.) With this in mind, the Court of Appeals found that Trooper Marquez
had a

r~asonable

suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo

based on the same facts cited by the district court, including the
Muerte figurine.

(Opinion, p.8.)

of the

Finally, the Court of Appeals refused to consider

Mr. Perez-Jungo's argument that the Santa Muerte figurine should not be used to
support reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking because it claimed that the argument
was not made below. (Opinion, p.8 n.?.)
Mr. Perez-Jungo filed a timely petition for review following the issuance of the
Opinion.
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ISSUES
1.

the Idaho Supreme Court should grant review of the Idaho Court of
Appeals' Opinion affirming the district court's denial of Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion
to Suppress is in conflict with previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of Appeals.
Whether the district court's order denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress
should be reversed because his prolonged detention and the subsequent search
of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Should Grant Review Of The Idaho Court Of Appeals'
Opinion Affirming The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion To Suppress
Because It Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court,
The Idaho Supreme Court, And The Idaho Court Of Appeals

A.

Introduction
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted

only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court.

I.A.R. 118(b ).

Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five

factors which must be considered in evaluating any petition for review:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court;

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;

3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;

4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the
Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and,

5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.

I.A.R. 118(b).

In this case, Mr. Perez-Jungo contends that there are special and

important reasons for review to be granted because the Court of Appeals' decision is in
contravention of United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho Court
of Appeals precedent.

I.A.R. 118(b )(2)-(3). Therefore, this Court should exercise its

review authority in this case.
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B.

The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Erroneously Held That Police Officers May Detain
A Suspect VVhen The Officers Do Not Have Particularized Suspicion Of Criminal
Activity
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case ignored the requirement that the

suspicion must be particularized in order to amount to reasonable suspicion.
Fourth Amendment to the United

<.:t"t""

The

Constitution provides: "The right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CaNST. amend IV. The Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,524 (1986).
The Idaho Constitution provides similar protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures. IDAHO CaNST. Art. I,§ 17; State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,471 (2001).
A unanimous United

Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches

are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment. The State can only
overcome that presumption by demonstrating that one of the exceptional, wellestablished, and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable to
the facts. /d. at 390-91; see also State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding
the same standard applies to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution).
An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable
suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed
or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

Reasonable

suspicion must be more than a hunch or an unparticularized suspicion of criminal
activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). In
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to be a "particularized"

the officer's suspicion must satisfy two

(1) the

must be based on the totality of the

circumstances, and (2) the

must yield a particularized suspicion that the

individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.

State v. Swindle, 148

Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009).
The Court of Appeals held that Trooper Marquez did not have to have a
particularized suspicion of either driving under the influence or drug trafficking, only that
he had to have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Perez-Jungo was involved in some
criminal activity.

(Opinion, pp.6-7.)

The Court of Appeals also held that it was

unnecessary to evaluate separately whether Trooper Marquez had reasonable
suspicion to support t1is investigation for driving under the influence or for trafficking
drugs. (Opinion, p.6.) In doing so, the Court of Appeals ignored the requirement that a
suspicion must be particularized in order to amount to reasonable suspicion. While the
Court of Appeals is correct that reasonable suspicion does not require suspicion of a
specific crime, it does require enough facts to make the suspicion particularized. Terry,
supra, 392 U.S. at 22. It logically follows that, if there are not enough facts to support
suspicion of any criminal activity - in this case, DUI or drug trafficking - then the
suspicion is merely a hunch. Thus, an officer must be able to show some grouping of
facts that supports some criminal activity in order to detain a citizen to conduct an
investigation.
Here, Trooper Marquez numerous hunches. First, based on the location of the
vehicle and the time of night, he had a hunch that the vehicle might be stolen or
abandoned. (Tr., p.13, L.24- p.14, L.24.) Also based on the location and time of night,
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Trooper Marquez had a hunch that the vehicle might be involved in vandalism or theft of
radio towers.
glassy

(Tr., p.1

Ls.1

p.40,

1

)

Based on Mr.

Perez~Jungo's

red

and the location and time of night, Trooper Marquez had a hunch that

Mr. Perez-Jungo might be under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-21.) Then,
based on the location and

of night, and the Santa

figurine, Trooper

Marquez had a hunch that Mr. Perez-Jungo was a drug trafficker. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-21.)
Basically, as Trooper Marquez himself stated, "obviously something was not right."
(Tr., p.47, Ls.15-19.)
Clearly, Trooper Marquez did not have to provide facts that supported every
element of driving under the influence or drug trafficking.
claim that he detained Mr. Perez-Jungo for driving under
trafficking, then he must be able to point to facts that are

if he is going to
influence or drug
to one of those

particular offenses and those facts must be enough to elevate a hunch to a reasonable
suspicion of some criminal activity.

Otherwise, officers would satisfy the reasonable

suspicion requirement by listing random factors that could be related to one or more
offenses and stating, "I suspected that criminal activity was afoot."

The Fourth

Amendment clearly requires more.
Because the Opinion does not require that an officer have a particularized
suspicion in order to conduct an investigation, it is contradictory to established
precedent. Therefore, this Court should exercise its review authority in this case.
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C.
District Court As A Basis For Its Decision Is Not Preserved For Appeal If It Was
Not Argued By Counsel Below
The Court of Appeals refused to consider Mr. Perez-Jungo's argument that the
Santa Muerte figurine should hold little, if any weight, in a reasonable suspicion
determination for drug trafficking because it claimed that the argument was not made by
defense counsel below. (Opinion, p.8, fn. 7.) This position is clearly in conflict with prior
decisions of this Court.

First, the issue to be preserved is whether or not Trooper

Marquez had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo. This issue was clearly
argued below by both parties. (See generally Tr.) The significance of the figurine is not
an "issue," it is a fact. This fact was also addressed at the Motion to

hearing.

Trooper Marquez testified that the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine was a basis for
his suspicions.

(Tr., p.22, Ls.16-21.)

At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress,

defense counsel specifically cross-examined Deputy Kingsland about the religious
significance of Santa Muerte. (Tr., p.59, L.20 - p.60, L.6.) A photograph of the Santa
Muerte figurine was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 5. (R., p.120.)
Further, even if each particular fact of a case must be independently preserved,
the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine falls into a clearly stated exception because
the district court found that the Santa Muerte figurine was a basis for reasonable
suspicion. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397 (2003) ("To properly raise an
issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court below or the issue
must have been raised in the court below, an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal"); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) ("An exception to this rule [that
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not raised below cannot be
rt when the

on appeal],

been applied

this

was argued to or decided by the trial court.")

Specifically, the district court stated in its decision that, "Marquez also observed
the Santa Muerte statue which is, as Marquez has learned through drug interdiction
training, a common patron saint to drug traffickers." (R., p.134.) The district court then
cited two federal court cases where the image of Santa Muerte has been "linked to drug
trafficking or criminal activity." (R., p.135.) The district court concluded that Trooper
Marquez had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Perez-Jungo was "driving while impaired
and/or had drugs in the vehicle" because Mr. Perez-Jungo's eyes were bloodshot and
Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked in a remote area at night and explained that he
was waiting to speak with someone about a job, and a Santa Muerte figurine was on the
dashboard. (R., p.135.)
Defense counsel below argued that Trooper Marquez did not have reasonable
suspicion to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and the district court determined that the Trooper
Marquez did have reasonable suspicion based, in part, on the presence of the Santa
Muerte figurine. The issue of whether there was reasonable suspicion and the fact that
the Santa Muerte figurine existed were preserved. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is
clearly contradictory to Idaho Supreme Court precedent and, therefore, this Court
should exercise its review authority in this case.
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II.

Reversed Because His Prolonged Detention And The Subsequent Search Of His
Vehicle Violated His Fourth Amendment Rights

A

Introduction
The district court erred in denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress

because Mr. Perez-Jungo's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police officers
prolonged their detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo. The State failed to meet its burden of
showing that Trooper Marquez had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain
Mr. Perez-Jungo after Trooper Marquez performed a welfare check.
district

As such, the

denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress should be reversed.

B.
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals
articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress:
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.

/d. at 302 (citations omitted).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion To Suppress
Because His Detention Was Illegally Prolonged And, Therefore, Any Evidence
Collected Must Be Suppressed As Fruit Of Illegal Government Activity
As noted above, a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively a violation of

the Fourth Amendment unless the government can prove that the search and seizure
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the warrant requirement or was otherwise

within a
reasonable under
Nampshire, 403 U

circumstance.

search, including

Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996).

If the

this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal

later~discovered

inadmissible in court.

Const. amend. IV; Coolidge v. New

443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129

(Ct. App. 2002); State v. Martinez, 1
government fails to

U

evidence derived from the original illegal search, is

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); State v.

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219 (1999).

1.

Jungo After He Completed His Community Caretaking Role
Trooper

Mr.

Perez~Jungo

when

activated his emergency

lights and pulled up behind him. A person is seized or detained within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have believed he or she was no longer free to leave. State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864,
866 (Ct. App. 1995). Although a detention may not have been intended by Trooper
Marquez at this point, a detention occurred because Mr. Perez-Jungo was not free to
leave.

See I.C. § 49-1404 (prohibiting fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer

when signaled to stop by the officer's emergency lights and/or siren); Maddox, supra,
137 Idaho at 824; State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an
officer activating emergency lights while performing a caretaking function constitutes a
de facto detention). Further, even if Trooper Marquez's use of his emergency lights did

not constitute a seizure, a seizure certainly occurred when Trooper Marquez took and
retained Mr. Perez-Jungo's driver's license and registration since Mr. Perez-Jungo
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without

could not drive

v. Osborne, 121 Idaho

v. Goodwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493 (1991 );
(Ct. App. 1991 ).

Although the initial detention was justified under Trooper Marquez's community
caretaking function, the detention became illegal because Trooper Marquez continued
to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo after his community caretaking role was complete.
The community caretaking function arises from the duty of police officers to help citizens
in need of assistance and is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Maddox, supra,
137 Idaho at 824. The community caretaking function only justifies a detention if there

Cutler, supra, 143 Idaho at 303.

is a present need for
Here, Trooper

testified that, upon seeing the truck, he was: (1)

concerned that the truck was abandoned; (2) concerned that someone might need help;
(3) concerned that the vehicle was stolen; and (4) concerned that the truck might be
involved in thefts or vandalisms that occurred in the area. (Tr., p.40, Ls.14-25.) In order
to justify the detention of a citizen under the community caretaking exception, the officer
must have a genuine and warranted concern rather than simply the officer's curiosity, an
unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal activity, or an unwarranted concern that help
might be needed. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841,844 (2004); Maddox, supra, 137 Idaho
at 824-25. Clearly, only the first two concerns identified by Trooper Marquez fall under
the community caretaking function as defined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Page.
The other two concerns are criminal in nature and require reasonable suspicion to
justify a detention.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., 1, 21 (1968).

As discussed in

subsection (C)(2), reasonable suspicion did not exist to support Trooper Marquez's
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hunches that the truck was stolen or that it was involved in

vandalism of radio

towers.
Therefore, Trooper Marquez's initial detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo can only be
justified by the community caretaking function, the scope of which is limited.

After

shining his spotlight on the truck, Trooper Marquez could clearly see that there was a
person in the driver's seat, immediately dispelling any concern that the truck was
abandoned. (Tr., p.41, Ls.1

) Upon making contact with Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper

Marquez questioned Mr. Perez-Jungo about what he was doing and Mr. Perez-Jungo
explained that he was waiting for a friend to talk to about a job. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-15.) At
that point, both of Trooper Marquez's caretaking concerns had
truck was not abandoned, and

addressed; the

Perez-Jungo did not need help.

Trooper Marquez then requested Mr. Perez-Jungo's

and registration.

Although this action lengthened Mr. Perez-Jungo's detention, the Idaho Supreme Court
has held that, even when an officer is acting in a community caretaking capacity and
has determined that the driver does not need assistance, he may request and run a
status check on the person's driver's license.

Goodwin, supra, 121 Idaho at 494-95.

Therefore, this action was not outside the boundaries of the community caretaking
exception. However, after running Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and registration through
dispatch and determining that there were no issues, Trooper Marquez did not return the
license and registration and allow Mr. Perez-Jungo to leave, as was required at the
conclusion of his community caretaking duties. Rather, Trooper Marquez continued to
detain Mr. Perez-Jungo for at least 10 minutes while he waited for back-up units, and
then proceeded to order Mr. Perez-Jungo out of his car. (Tr., p.25, Ls.5-12, 21-23.)
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the license and registration came

clear,

cause to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and no reason to

no further
him out of his car.

This

constituted an illegal detention that was not justified by the community caretaker
exception.

2.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Continue To
Detain Mr. Perez-Jungo

An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible based upon reasonable
suspicion, derived from specific articulable facts, that the person stopped has committed
or is about to commit a crime. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21;

v. Salata, 137 Idaho

(Ct. App. 2001 ). Although the required information leading to formation of
suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the information
required to form probable cause, it still "must be more than mere speculation or a hunch
on the part of the police officer." State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2005).
The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the stop, and the "whole picture must yield a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or has been
engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997).
Here, Trooper Marquez testified to four possible suspicions of criminal activity:
(1) The truck Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving was stolen; (2) Mr. Perez-Jungo was
somehow involved in the vandalisms or thefts involving radio towers that had occurred
in the area four to six weeks prior; (3) Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving under the influence
of drugs or alcohol; and (3) Mr. Perez-Jungo was trafficking narcotics. None of these
suspicions were supported by specific, articulable facts.
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a.

Mr. Perez-Jungo's Truck Was Stolen
Trooper Marquez testified that he was initiaily concerned that

Perez-Jungo's

truck was stolen. (Tr., p.40, Ls.24-25.) Trooper Marquez did not provide a single fact
supporting this hunch.

However, upon running Mr. Perez-Jungo's license and

registration through dispatch and determining that the truck was, in fact, not stolen, his
unsubstantiated concern was immediately dispelled. (Tr., p.41, Ls.18-22.) Therefore,
Trooper Marquez had no reason to continue the detention to investigate whether the
truck was stolen.

b.

Towers
Trooper Marquez did not articulate a single reason why he suspected that
Mr. Perez-Jungo was involved in the vandalism or thefts of radio towers.

Trooper

Marquez testified that he received an email in the last four or six weeks stating that
there

had

been

prior vandalisms

of radio

towers

in

the

area.

(Tr., p.9,

Ls.S-11.) However, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the rural, gravel
road where Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked is, or ever was, a "high crime" area. Further,
even if the location were a high crime area, mere presence in a high crime area is not
enough to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho
1007, 1010 (1989) (holding that a driver who hesitates at a stop sign for a longer period
than usual, in the middle of the night, in an area where recent burglaries had taken
place, does not rise to the articulable level of suspicion necessary for a seizure). As the
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Idaho Supreme Court stated in McAfee,
are driving

night and

on a

/d. at 1009.
The fact that a crime may have occurred in the area more than a month prior is
not grounds for detaining a person who happens to be parked in that area. Such a rule
would allow officers to stop every single person on the road for months after a crime
occurs. Here, there was no evidence tying Mr. Perez-Jungo to the vanda!isms or thefts
of the radio towers.

There was no indication that a suspect or vehicle description

existed or that it matched Mr. Perez-Jungo or his truck. There were no statements, tips,
photos, or any other evidence implicating Mr. Perez-Jungo.

Therefore, Trooper

Marquez's hunch was entirely unsubstantiated and he did not have a reasonable
suspicion that would justify an investigation of theft or vandalism.

c.

Trooper Marquez Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion That
Mr. Perez-Jungo Was Driving Under The Influence

Reasonable suspicion should be evaluated by considering the totality of the
information known to the officer at the time. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981 ).

Trooper Marquez testified that he suspected that Mr. Perez-Jungo might be

driving under the influence because his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.19-21.) Although bloodshot and glassy eyes may be considered in the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, no reported case has
ever held that bloodshot and glassy eyes, alone, constitutes a reasonable suspicion of
driving under the influence. In Idaho, every case involving bloodshot and glassy eyes
as reasonable suspicion identifies some other evidence of alcohol or drug use. See,
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v.

149 Idaho 361, 364 (Ct. App. 201 0) (detention was reasonable
had bloodshot and glassy eyes, reddening

the conjunctiva of his

and eyelid tremors); State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140 (Ct. App.
(probable cause existed to arrest defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her
speech, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and seemed confused); State v. Johnson, 137
Idaho 656, 658-60 (Ct. App. 2002) (further detention of defendant was reasonable when
defendant exhibited extreme nervousness, smelled like alcohol, admitted to drinking
alcohol, and had dilated and bloodshot eyes); State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605
(Ct. App. 1993) (reasonable suspicion existed to detain defendant when defendant had
bloodshot eyes, admitted to consuming alcohol, and slurred her speech).
jurisdictions have found that bloodshot eyes alone are not enough to establish
reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed.

e.g., Ferris v. State, 735

A.2d 491 (Md. 1999); State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars and No/100 in
U.S. Currency, 136 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).

Further, no additional factors existed that would support reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Perez-Jungo was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

In addition to

observing Mr. Perez-Jungo eyes, Trooper Marquez stated that he was aware of the time
of night, the remote location, the "odd hours to be talking to someone about
employment," and the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine. (Tr., p.23, Ls.13-25, p.22,
Ls.16-21.) These observations do not amount to reasonable suspicion to believe that
Mr. Perez-Jungo was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. As discussed above, the
location where Mr. Perez-Jungo was parked was not a high crime area and simply
driving or parking late at night is not, by itself, suspicious. Similarly, Mr. Perez-Jungo's

22

for why he was there, that he was meeting a friend to discuss a job, was not
contradicted. Although

Marquez was not required to believe Mr. Perez-Ju

explanation, the explanation itself was forthright and reasonable. See, contra, State v.
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (2001) (co-travelers' conflicting stories about their
destination and the purpose of their trip supported reasonable suspicion). Finally, the
presence of a Santa Muerte figurine, discussed in subsection (C)(2)(d), has no relation
to driving under the influence and should not be considered as reasonable suspicion to
investigate a person for DUI.
Mr. Perez-Jungo asserts that none of the factors identified by Trooper Marquez,
even taken together, support reasonable suspicion that a person is driving under
influence

for

glassy eyes. Mr. Perez-Jungo further

that

bloodshot and glassy eyes, alone, are not enough to establish reasonable suspicion
that an individual is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. There are numerous other
causes for bloodshot and glassy eyes. Here, Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving late at night
and tiredness often causes bloodshot and glassy eyes. If this factor, alone, is sufficient
to create reasonable suspicion, any tired driver or person suffering from allergies will be
subject to detention for an investigation into the possibility they are under the influence
of drugs or alcohol.
Further, even if this Court were to determine that bloodshot and glassy eyes are
sufficient, alone, to justify a detention and investigation for driving under the influence,
Trooper Marquez went beyond the scope of the investigation and illegally prolonged his
detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo because he waited for a drug dog to arrive, rather than
conduct a DUI investigation.

(Tr., p.24, Ls.9-15, p.25, Ls.1-12.) Where a person is
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of detention must
460 U

carefully tailored to its underlying justification.

491 , 500 ( 1983 ).

An investigative detention "must be

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
ld; see also Goodwin, supra, 121 Idaho at 501.

Further, the investigative methods

employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. /d. In a DUI investigation, field sobriety
are the least intrusive means of investigation. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,
482 (Ct. App. 1999). Since a drug dog has no relation to a DUI investigation, Trooper
Marquez would only be able to justify

delay if he also had a reasonable suspicion

Mr. Perez-Jungo was trafficking drugs.

d.

Trooper Marquez testified that he suspected that Mr. Perez-Jungo might be
trafficking drugs. The reasons that Trooper Marquez gave to support this hunch were
the same as those he gave to support his hunch that Mr. Perez-Jungo was driving
under the influence, namely the time of night, the remote location, the "odd hours to be
talking to someone about employment," and the presence of the Santa Muerte figurine.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.13-25, p.22, Ls.16-21.) As discussed above, the first three factors do not
create reasonable suspicion of any crime, and certainly not drug trafficking. The only
other factor Trooper Marquez identified was the presence of a Santa Muerte figurine on
the dashboard, which he testified was associated with drug traffickers. (Tr., p.21, Ls.14.)
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to
in drug trafficking cases.

figurines
add

if

these saints and other folk heroes, commonly
done so in the

Pena

of

to

to the

courts that
Malverde and Santa

testimony.

United States v.

(8th Cir. 2009).

courts have refused to

consider the presence of such saints at all, citing constitutional concerns.
State v.

La Rosa, 208 P.3d 1012, 1018 n

See e.g.

(Or. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to consider

the observation of a ,Jesus Malverde medallion in its reasonable suspicion calculus,
officer's "detailed testimony" about the training and
symbolism,
Latin

is also

onr·-~rcu•

he received
by poor people in

and "permitting officials to conduct otherwise unlawful searches

a medallion that supposedly has significance only to Hispanics

on

the same kind of

serious constitutional concerns as other forms of profiling").
Although sorne courts have found that the presence of a Santa Muerte or Jesus
Malverde statue or image can be a factor in a reasonable suspicion determination, the
officers in every one of those cases had significant particularized suspicion beyond the
presence of the saints. See, e.g., Pena-Ponce, supra, 588 F.3d. at 584 (officers had
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking when suspect stalled while answering
questions, the passenger in the car showed excessive nervousness, the suspect and
the passenger had conflicting stories about where they had been, there were multiple
cell phones in the truck and the passenger tried to kick one of the phones out of view,
and there was a Santa Muerte figurine on the dashboard); United States v. LopezGutierrez, 334 Fed. Appx. 880 (1Oth Cir. 2009) (officers had reasonable suspicion when
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they

scarring on the

icating

hide
three cells phones, one small su
had spent more than a

they

in

dashboard and around the

of

on the

neck); State v. Alvarez, 147 P.3d

(Utah

2006) (officers had reasonable suspicion when they observed the suspect
short visits on consecutive days to condominiums known for drug dealing,

two
tips had

received about drug dealing in the condominiums, one of which was specific to the
vehicle, and a Jesus Malverde medallion was present).
Unlike clothing displaying
is a common Mexican

or other direct drug
icon.

(See Exhibit 11.) While it is true that
or trafficking, such

innocuous items may indicate drug

Santa

not, without more, create reasonable suspicion.

individually do

For example, a straw would not,

without additional factors, amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. A straw
is a common piece of drug paraphernalia, but it also has obvious ordinary uses.
Similarly, a Santa Muerte figurine may indicate drug trafficking, but it may also indicate
a popular religious symbol or simply an affinity for skeletons in robes. Here, Trooper
Marquez did not have any evidence of drug trafficking beyond the presence of the
Santa Muerte figurine and his hunch that "something isn't right." At the time that he
detained Mr. Perez-Jungo, Trooper Marquez did not smell marijuana, see any residue
or indication of drugs, or see anything that could be identified as drug paraphernalia.
He merely saw a person parked at night in a rural area with a Santa Muerte figurine on
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the dashboard.

This is

speculation or hunch"

Amendment prohibits.
In sum, Trooper Marquez's hunches ranged from driving under the influence
trafficking narcotics to vandalizing radio

Not a single one of these hu

was

supported by reasonable suspicion, and multiple unsubstantiated hunches do not
particularized suspicion of criminal activity.

Contrary to the district court's ultimate

finding, the State failed to provide evidence of reasonable articulable suspicion for
Trooper Marquez to continue to detain Mr. Perez-Jungo and, therefore, all evidence
obtained as a result of the prolonged detention must be suppressed.

Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activi!Y
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura, supra, 468 U.S. at
815; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho
245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint." Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. at 488.

Suppression is required if "the evidence

sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the government's
unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
Trooper Marquez illegally prolonged his detention of Mr. Perez-Jungo after he
had performed his caretaking function.

Had Mr. Perez-Jungo detention not been

illegally prolonged the evidence located in the vehicle would not have been discovered.
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failed to

its burden of showing that
1ecrea after the impermissible

is untainted;
must

as

it of

the illegal police activity.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Perez-Jungo respectfully requests that this Court

review authority

in this case. On review, he requests that this Court reverse the district court's decision
denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to Suppress, and remand the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24 1h day of June, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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